The aim of this paper is to show that partial probability can be justified from the standpoint of subjective probability in much the same way as classical probability does. The seminal works of Ramsey and De Finetti have furnished a method for assessing subjective probabilities: ask about the bets the decision-maker would be willing to place. So we introduce the concept of partial bet and partial Dutch Book and prove for partial probability a result similar to the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem. Finally, we make a comparison between two concepts of bet: we can bet our money on a sentence describing an event, or we can bet our money on the event itself, generally conceived as a set. These two ways of understanding a bet are equivalent in classical probability, but not in partial probability.
Partial probability
Classical probability theory is grounded on the concept of probability space, a triple (A, C A , p) where A is a sample space, C A is a field of sets on A and p : C A → [0, 1] is a probability measure, i.e. a function satisfying Kolmogoroff's axioms: 1) p(A) = 1, 2) p(X ∪ Y ) = p(X) + p(Y ), when X ∩ Y = ∅. In this way probability is seen as the measure of an event represented by a set of outcomes. Partial probability theory arises when we substitute classical events with partial events (see [6] ). If S is the sample space of an experiment, we define the set of all partial sets on S as the set D(S) = {(A, B) : A, B ⊆ S, and A ∩ B = ∅}. Every x ∈ A (resp.B) is said to be a positive (resp. negative) element of the The algebra D(S) = (D(S), ⊓, ⊔, −, 0, n, 1) is the algebra of all partial sets on S. A field of partial set is any subalgebra G S ⊆ D(S). A partial set (A, B) is a Boolean partial set if A = S − B. The set of Boolean partial sets is a Boolean algebra isomorphic to P(S), the classical power-set algebra. We define a binary relation between partial sets setting (A, B) ⊑ (C, D) iff A ⊆ C and D ⊆ B. It can be easily proved that (D(S), ⊑) is a partially ordered set with (S, ∅) as top and (∅, S) as bottom element. When S is a sample space, we say that D(S) is the algebra of partial events on S. In relation with the experimental result s ∈ S, we say that (A, B) occurs positively if s ∈ A, occurs negatively if s ∈ B, is uncertain otherwise. Events of classical probability theory are to be identified with Boolean partial sets and will be called Boolean or classical events.
We define on R 2 the relation setting (x, y) (w, z) iff x ≤ w e z ≤ y. (Note that the natural order of R is reversed on the second elements of the ordered pairs.) It can be easily shown that (R 2 , ) is a partially ordered set. The operations x + y, xy and −x in R are extended pointwise to the product R 2 , i.e. (x, y) + (z, w) = (x + z, y + w), (x, y)(z, w) = (xz, yw) and −(x, y) = (−x, −y). We define the set of partial probability values T as a subset of R 2 , setting T = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]
2 : x + y ≤ 1}. The probability value of a partial event (A, B) is a pair (x, y) ∈ T . The set of partial probability values T is partially ordered by with a maximum (1, 0) and a minimum (0, 1).
Given a partial field of set G S on S and a function µ : G S → T , we say that µ is a measure of partial probability when the following axioms are satisfied:
1. µ(S, ∅) = (1, 0). 2 → [0, 1] 2 is defined by σ(x, y) = (y, x). As a consequence of axiom 4, we have (0, 0) µ(A, ∅), for all (A, ∅) ∈ ∇. A partial probability space is a triple (S, G S , µ) where G S is a field of partial sets on the sample space S and µ is a measure of partial probability.
µ(A, B) + µ(C, D) = µ((A, B) ⊔ (C, D)) − µ((A, B) ⊓ (C, D)).

µ(−(
Given a classical probability space (S, P (S), p), we define the partial probability space associated to (S, P (S), p) as follows: we define µ : D(S) → T setting µ(A, B) = (p(A), p(B)).
As (A, B) is a partial event, A ∩ B = ∅ so p(A) + p(B) = p(A ∪ B): this proves that µ(A, B) ∈ T . It can be easily proved that µ satisfies the four axioms above, so (S, D(S), µ) is a partial probability space. For instance, we can start from the classical probability space (S, P (S), p), where S = {n : 1 ≤ n ≤ 6} and p(n) = 1/6 for all n ∈ S. If (A, B) is the Boolean event with A = {2, 4, 6} and B = {1, 3, 5}, then µ(A, B) = (1/2, 1/2), and if (C, D) is the partial event with C = {2, 4} and D = {5}, then µ(C, D) = (1/3, 1/6). If the outcome of the experiment is 3, then we say that (A, B) does not happen and that (C, D) is uncertain (neither happens nor does not happen). Some events like (A, ∅) have only positive occurrences (may only happen), others like (∅, A) have only negative occurrences, (∅, ∅) is the absolutely undefined event.
We list some differences between classical and partial probability. 2. Additivity holds in the form of axiom 2, but now we have different kinds of disjointness. In a field of partial sets D(S), the partial sets like (∅, X), belonging to the interval [(∅, S), (∅, ∅)], are generalizations of the empty set (they have no positive elements); so we can say that (A, B) is disjoint from (C, D) if (A, B) ⊓ (C, D) = (∅, X), for some X. Now the partial probability of a sum of disjoint sets is the sum of their probabilities, µ(A, B)+µ(C, D) = µ((A, B)⊔(C, D)), only when (A, B) and (C, D) have the maximum degree of disjointness (∅, ∅).
3. Partial probability values are only partially ordered by , so we cannot say, in general, whether a partial event is more probable then another partial event or not. However, it can be easily seen that the set of partial probability values of Boolean events is totally ordered by .
4. Conditioning on partial events is possible, but with a slightly different meaning with respect to the classical case. See [6] par. 4 and [7] par. 9, 13
The aim of this paper is to show that partial probability can be justified from the standpoint of subjective probability in much the same way as classical probability does. The seminal works of Ramsey and De Finetti have furnished a method for assessing subjective probabilities: ask about the bets the decisionmaker would be willing to place. In par. 2 we introduce the concept of classical bet and shortly review the proof of Ramsey-De Finetti theorem for classical probability. The remaining part of this paper is devoted to prove an analogous result in the case of partial subjective probability. To this scope we introduce in par. 3 the fundamentals concepts of Kleene logic. In par. 4 we introduce the concept of partial bet and partial Dutch Book and prove for partial probability a result similar to Ramsey-De Finetti theorem. In par. 5 we make a comparison between two concepts of bet: we can bet our money on a sentence describing an event, or we can bet our money on the event itself, generally conceived as a set. These two ways of understanding a bet are equivalent in the classical case, but not in the partial case.
Classical bets
In the subjective approach to probability, the bearers of probability are no more sets but sentences and the probability value is conceived as the degree of belief in some event represented by a sentence. So we introduce a sentential n-ary language L n based on the sentential variables P n = {p 1 , ..., p n }, the connectives {¬, ∧, ∨} and the constants {0, 1}. (Through this text we deal only with finite languages.) We denote with F n the set of formulas of L n and with F n the algebra of formulas. (We simply write L, P and F when no confusion is possible.) We say that a function π : F → [0, 1] is a probability function, if the following axioms are satisfied:
where |= is the consequence relation of bivalent logic. (See, for instance, [5] or [8] .) Both the measure-theoretic and the subjectivistic approach to classical probability are deeply grounded on Boolean algebras. On one side the events of a probability space constitute a Boolean algebra, on the other side the definition of a probability function requires the semantics of bivalent logic and Boolean truth-functions. Owing to this common ground, these two ways of presenting probability can be translated one into the other (see, for instance, [7] , par.4).
When does a function b : F → [0, 1], representing the decision-maker's belief, satisfy the axioms of probability function? The theorem that we are going to prove, commonly attributed to Ramsey and De Finetti (see [3] , p. 53), gives a sufficient condition through the concept of bet. We understand a bet as a triple (α, x, r) where α ∈ F , x ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ R. The formula α represents the event on which the bet is placed, x is the betting quotient and r the stake. By accepting this bet, we agree to pay out rx to receive r from the bookmaker if the event described by α takes place, and nothing otherwise. The buyer's payoff can be described by the following table:
r − rx = r(1 − x) if α is true in the actual world, −rx if α is false in the actual world.
We can obtain the bookmaker's payoff by changing the sign of the stake. In general, when we talk of 'payoff', we understand the buyer's payoff.
The payoff is a function of α, x, r and of the state of the world that makes α true or false. The definition of such a function requires some basic concepts in the semantics of classical logic. We identify with 2 n the set of all possible worlds, where 2 = {0, 1} is the set of truth-values of classical logic. Then, for every sentential variable p i , we can set V w (p i ) = w i : the truth-value of p i in the world w. As F is the absolutely free algebra, we know that V w can be extended to a homomorphism V w : F → 2, where 2 denotes the two-element Boolean algebra: V w (α) is the truth-value of α in the world w. We say that α is a consequence of γ, in symbols γ |= α, when V w (γ) ≤ V w (α) for all w ∈ 2 n . We say that α is a consequence of the set of formulas Γ, and write Γ |= α, when inf{V w (γ) : γ ∈ Γ} ≤ V w (α) for all w ∈ 2 n . When Γ = ∅ we write simply |= α and this amounts to V w (α) = 1, for all w ∈ 2 n , because inf{V w (γ) : γ ∈ ∅} = inf(∅) = 1. We say that two formulas α and β are equivalent and write α ≡ β iff α |= β and β |= α.
The semantics of classical logic can also be defined through a function that associates to every formula α its meaning M (α), conceived as the set of worlds in which α holds true. To this end we define M (p i ) = {w ∈ 2 n : w i = 1}, for all sentential variable p i : intuitively, M (p i ) is the set of all worlds making p i true. As F is the absolutely free algebra, we can extend M to a homomorphism from F to the Boolean algebra P(2 n ). The functions V w and M are related in this way: given V w , we can define M (α) as {w ∈ 2 n : V w (α) = 1} and given M we can define V w (α) = 1 iff w ∈ M (α) and
Now we return to the definition of the payoff. We associate to every bet (α, x, r) a function [α, x, r]:2 n → R that gives the payoff of (α, x, r) in the world w by
This definition can be naturally extended to finite sets of bets as follows. If B = {(α i , x i , r i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, then we define the payoff of the set B in the world w as
We say that a set of bets B is a Dutch Book if, for all w ∈ 2 n , [B](w) < 0. Intuitively, a Dutch Book is a set of bets that guarantees a sure loss for the buyer. There is, however, a weaker notion of Dutch Book that will be useful in the following, where the set of bets can at best break even and, in at least one possible world, has a net loss. We say that a set of bets B is a Weak Dutch Book if, for all w ∈ 2 n , [B](w) ≤ 0 and in at least one world w, [B](w) < 0. (This kind of Dutch Book has been introduced in [9] .) If we take the values of b : F → [0, 1] as betting quotients, i.e. the bets in B are of kind (α i , b(α i ), r), and if a Dutch Book is available with such betting rates, then we say that there is a Dutch Book for b.
Proof. The proof is an easy calculation with truth-tables and is left to the reader.
and there is no Dutch Book for b, then b is a probability function.
Secondly we show that
by the above lemma. If z + w < x + y, just change the sign of the stakes. Now we can easily prove axiom 2:
3 Partial subjective probability and Kleene logic
As we have seen in par. 2, classic probability can be understood as a degree of belief in a sentence. We can do the same with partial probability: we have only to shift from bivalent logic to Kleene logic and from probability values in [0, 1] to probability values in T . This should justify a brief digression in the semantics of Kleene logic.
The language of Kleene n-ary logic is L * n = L n ∪ {n}, where L n is the n-ary language of classical logic introduced in par. 2. We denote with F * n the set of formulas of L * n and with F * n the algebra of n-ary formula. We write simply L * , F * and F * when no confusion is possible. We denote with K the set {0, n, 1} of truth-values of Kleene logic, where n stands for 'neutral' or 'uncertain'. Every w ∈ K n cas be seen as an instantaneous description of the world, at the level of the atomic facts represented by sentential variables, so we can define a function V w from {p i : i ≤ n} to K setting V w (p i ) = w i . When w i = n, the atomic fact represented by p i neither happens nor does not happen. This uncertainty may be of an epistemic kind, related to a lack of knowledge, or may be deeply rooted in the reality. The next step is extending V w to all formulas an to this end we give an algebraic structure to the set of truth-values as follows: we define on K the total order 0 < n < 1 and define x ∧ y = min(x, y) and x ∨ y = max(x, y), what amounts to giving the following truth-tables: ∧ 1 0 n 1 1 0 n 0 0 0 0 n n 0 n ∨ 1 0 n 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 n n 1 n n As for negation, we set ¬(n) = n, ¬(0) = 1, ¬(1) = 0. Finally, we denote with K the algebra (K, ∧, ∨, ¬, 0, 1, n). As F * is the absolutely free algebra, we can extend V w to an homomorphism V w : F → K. So we say that α is true in w iff V w (α) = 1, false if V w (α) = 0 and neutral if V w (α) = n. We say that two formulas α and β are equivalent and write α ≡ β iff V w (α) w = V w (β) w , for all w ∈ K n . The semantics of Kleene logic can also be defined through a function that associates to every formula α its meaning M (α) conceived as a partial set in D(K n ), where M (α) 0 and M (α) 1 are the set of worlds in which α is respectively true and false, the positive and the negative models of α. Firstly, we define a function M :
As F * is free, we extend M to a homomorphism M : F → D(K n ). Then the meanings of formulas can be recursively defined by the following equations:
These two ways of giving a semantics are equivalent: if we take the notion of meaning given by M as primitive, then we can define
if we take the notion of truth in the possible world w given by V w as primitive, then
We define the notion of logical consequence as follows:
In terms of V s , the definition runs as follows:
As in the case of classical logic, an easy calculation based on truth-tables gives the following theorem.
Now we can define the notion of partial probability function. As the axioms of probability function (see par. 2) are modeled on Kolmogoroff's axioms, so the axioms of partial probability function are modeled on the axioms of measure of partial probability introduced in par. 1. We say that π : F * → T is a partial probability function if the following axioms are satisfied, where |= denotes logical consequence in Kleene logic:
We call π(α) the partial degree of belief in α of our decision-maker. The following theorem shows some fundamental properties of π.
Theorem 4
If π is a partial probability function on L * n , then 1. π(n) = (0, 0).
Proof. 1. From n |= n we have (0, 0) π(n), by axiom 4. In Kleene logic we have n |= ¬n and so (0, 0) π(¬n). In general we have (x, y)
σ(x, y), thus σ(π(¬(n))) (0, 0). By axiom 3, σ(π(¬(n))) = σ(σ(π(n))) = π(n) holds. Thus π(n) (0, 0).
2. In Kleene logic α |= 0 implies 1 |= ¬α and so, by axiom 1, π(¬α) = (1, 0). Thus, by axiom 3, σ(π(α)) = (1, 0) e π(α) = (0, 1).
3. In Kleene logic α |= n implies n |= ¬α, so (0, 0) π(¬α) = σ(π(α)) and π(α) (0, 0).
by axiom 2 and point 1).
Partial bets
A classical bet is a mechanism that receives a triple constituted by a sentence α in the language L of classical logic, a betting quotient x ∈ [0, 1] and a stake r ∈ R as input, and gives a payoff, represented by a real number as output. We observe that both payoffs and stakes belong to R, besides, the set of truth-values of sentences {0, 1}, betting rates [0, 1] and stakes R are related by {0, 1} ⊆ [0, 1] ⊆ R. As a result we have been able to define the payoff [α, x, r](w) of a classical bet in the world w as r(V w (α) − x).
When we consider a partial bet, we begin with a sentence α in the language L * of Kleene and a betting quotient (x, y) ∈ T . The first step is finding a common ground for truth-values of Kleene logic and partial probability values, so we make K ⊆ T by giving a new definition of K. So, from now on, we set K = {(0, 1), (0, 0), (1, 0)}. After all, the essential nature of truth-values is immaterial, as long as their formal properties remain unchanged. If we restrict to K the partial order defined on T , we have (0, 1) (0, 0) (1, 0) where (0, 1) stands for 'false', (0, 0) for 'neutral' and (1, 0) for 'true'. We define the algebra K of truth values as above. For reader's convenience we write the new truth-tables: As for ¬, we have ¬(0, 1) = (1, 0) and ¬(0, 0) = (0, 0). Finally we get a homomorphism V w : F * → K and V w (α) will be the truth-value of α in the world w ∈ K n . The proof of lemma 3 remains obviously unchanged. The second step is finding a common ground for partial probability values and stakes, so we define a stake as a pair (h, k) in R 2 . The payoff of a partial bet will be an element of R 2 too. Stakes and payoffs are ordered by the same partial order defined on partial probability values. So R 2 is the common ground for truth-values, partial probability values, stakes and payoffs In view of the particular partial ordering of payoffs, some considerations are in order. (And the same holds for stakes.) A payoff (h, k) has a positive part h and a negative part k. If h > 0 then h is a reward and if h < 0 then h is a loss, but on the second elements the order is reversed, so k > 0 is a true loss and k < 0 is a true reward. The positive and negative parts may come from completely different domains, so we may think the first value h representing the gain or loss of money and the second value k representing a degree of physical pain or gratification. What is essential is that we cannot in principle strike a balance between the first and the second component of (h, k) and reduce the pair to a single number.
As is a partial order, we cannot say in general whether (h, k) is better than (h ′ , k ′ ), but we can make the following distinctions. We can partition R 2 in three exhaustive and disjoint subsets: the diagonal δ = {(x, x) : x ∈ R}, the pairs under the diagonal δ + = {(x, y) : x > y} and the pairs over the diagonal δ − = {(x, y) : x < y}. The elements of δ are 'neutral payoffs': if the first component h is positive and so can be seen as a gain, then the second element h represents a loss of the same intensity. The situation is reversed when h is negative. The elements of δ + give more reward than punishment and the elements of δ − behave in the opposite way, so a payoff in δ + can be seen as 'good' and a payoff in δ − as 'bad'. Now we can introduce the concept of partial bet as a triple (a, (x, y), (h, k)) where α is a formula of L * n , (x, y) ∈ T , (h, k) ∈ R 2 . We can describe the payoff of the buyer for (a, (x, y), (h, k)) by the following table, (h, k)((1, 0) − (x, y)) = (h(1 − x), −ky) if α is true in the actual world (h, k)((0, 0) − (x, y)) = (−hx, −ky) if α is neutral in the actual world (h, k)((0, 1) − (x, y)) = (−hx, k(1 − y)) if α is false in the actual world.
The net gain varies as the actual world w varies in the set K n of the possible worlds, so we define a function [α, (xy), (h, k)]:K n → R 2 that gives the payoff of (α, (xy), (h, k)) in the world w by
As in the case of classical bets, this definition can be naturally extended to finite sets of bets as follows. If B = {(α i , (x i , y i ), (h i , k i )) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, then we define the net gain of the set B in the world w as
The definition of Dutch Book is slightly different from the classical case. The payoffs of classical bets are in R with its natural order ≤, so 0 is an equilibrium point between loss, negative real numbers, and rewards, positive natural numbers. The payoffs of partial bets are in R 2 partially ordered by , where δ is a natural separation between loss, the pairs in δ − , and reward, the pairs in δ + . So we say that a set of partial bets B is a Dutch Book if, for all w ∈ 2 n , [B](w) ∈ δ − . Intuitively, a Dutch Book is a set of bets that guarantees more loss than reward for the buyer. We say that a set of partial bets B is a Weak Dutch Book if, for all w ∈ 2 n , [B](w) ∈ δ − ∪ δ and there is at least one possible world w such that [B](w) ∈ δ − : so in all cases we have no gain and in some cases a sure loss. If B is a Dutch Book then B is obviously a Weak Dutch Book too.
Given a function b from the set F * of formulas of Kleene logic to the set T of partial probability values, we say that B is a (Weak) Dutch Book for π if B is a (Weak) Dutch Book and the bets in B are of kind (α i , b(α i ), (h i , k i )), where the betting rates are given by b. Now we can prove a result similar to theorem 2.
Lemma 5 For all (x, y), (z, w) ∈ T , if (y, x) = (z, w) and
Proof. Firstly, we observe that x, y, z and w all belong to [0, 1] because (x, y) and (z, w) belong to T . Secondly, if we set k ′ = q + h and k = t + h ′ , then we reduce ourselves to prove that there are q, t, h, h ′ , with q, t > 0 such that
Now we distinguish two cases. Case1, 0 < y, w. The above equation can be rewritten as qw + ty = h(x − w) − h ′ (y − z). From our hypothesis x + z = y + w we have x − w = y − z, so we obtain qw + ty = h(x − w) − h ′ (x − w) that can also be written as
a linear equation in two unknowns q, t and parameters h, h ′ , w, x, y, with w, y = 0.This equation can be plotted as a line with negative slope, as t varies on the horizontal axis and q on the vertical axis. We can choose h and h ′ such that the set of pairs (t, q) satisfying (1), with t, q > 0, is not empty. To this scope we make the t-intercept positive and the q-intercept positive, i.e.
(Remember that w, y = 0.) With such a choice of h and h ′ , any pair (t, q) such that (2) holds and
gives a solution. (The case x = w is impossible, because from x = w and the hypothesis x + z = y + w we have y = z, that is contrary to our hypothesis (y, x) = (z, w).) Case 2, y = 0, or w = 0. Subcase a), y = 0. Firstly we prove that w = 0 and z = 0. If w = 0 then, from our hypothesis x + z = y + w we have x + z = 0 and so x = z = 0. Then x, y, z, w are all 0 and an absurd follows our hypothesis (y, x) = (z, w). If z = 0 then (x, y) = (x, 0) and (z, w) = (0, w), so from our hypothesis (y, x) = (z, w) we have x = w. But x + z = y + w holds by hypothesis, so x + 0 = 0 + w and x = w, that is absurd. Now equation (1) reduces hx + h ′ z = (q + h)w, because y = 0 by hypothesis, that can be rewritten as
By hypothesis, x + z = y + w = w, so x − w = −z, so the above equation becomes −hz + h ′ z = qw, that can be rewritten as
where w > 0 and z > 0, so we get q > 0 by choosing h ′ > h. Subcase b), w = 0. The proof is similar to subcase a).
Theorem 6
If b : F → T and there is no Weak Dutch Book for, then b is a partial probability function.
Proof. We prove that b satisfies the four axioms of partial probability function. Axiom 1. We must prove that 1 |= α implies b(α) = (1, 0), so we suppose b(α) = (x, y) = (1, 0) and set B = {(α, (x, y), (−1, −11))}. We have, for all
From (x, y) = (1, 0) we have x < 1. (As (x, y) ∈ T , (x, y) = (1, 0) means (x, y) ≺ (1, 0), so x < 1.) So we have x − 1 < 0 and 0 ≤ y and then (x − 1, y) ≺ (0, 0).
where the next to last line follows from lemma 3 and the last line from our hypothesis. As [B](w) ∈ δ − for all w ∈ K n , B is a Dutch Book for b. 
We note that
By hypothesis x + z < y + w, so in both cases [B](w) ∈ δ − and B is a Dutch Book.
Case 2, y + w < x + z. We take B as in case 1, but change the stake (−1, −1) in (1, 1), then we have
In both cases we have a point in δ − because, by hypothesis, −(x+z) < −(y +w). Case 3, x + z = y + w. We show that there are stakes (h, k) and (h ′ , k ′ ) such that, setting
we have [B](w) ∈ δ − for all w ∈ K n . Firstly we observe that
Then, by the above lemma, we can choose h, h, h
and ii) h < k ′ and h ′ > k. So in the first and third case we have a point in δ − and in the second case we have a point in δ. This proves that [B](w) ∈ δ − ∪ δ and B is a Weak Dutch Book. Axiom 4. We must prove that n |= α implies (0, 0) b(α). We suppose that b(α) = (x, y) and (0, 0) (x, y). We set B = {(a, (x.y), (0, −1))}. From the hypothesis n |= α we know that, for all w ∈ K n , V w (n) ≤ V w (α). As V w (n) = (0, 0), we have V w (α) = (0, 0) or V w (α) = (1, 0). Then, for all w ∈ K n ,
In both cases we have [B](w) = (0, y). As (x, y) is a partial probability value, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1; if y = 0 then (0, 0) (x, y), but by hypothesis (0, 0) (x, y), so 0 < y . Then we have (0, y) ≺ (0, 0), so [B](w) ∈ δ − and B is a Dutch Book.
Equivalence
We conclude our work with some remarks about the concept of bet. We start with classical bets. If b : F → [0, 1] is to represent the degree of belief of a decision-maker, logically equivalent formulas of classical logic should receive the same probability value. We can show that this is the case, when there is no Dutch Book for b. We suppose that α ≡ β in classical logic and
we choose a stake −1 for the bet on α and a stake 1 for the bet on β.
From this observation we can see that the concept of bet introduced above is substantially equivalent to another that is common in the literature (see, for instance, [4] p. 20-23). In fact, we can define a bet as a triple (U, x, r), where U ⊆ 2 n , x ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ R, so in this way we are betting on an event, a set of possible world U , instead of betting on a formula α. If we denote with B the set of all bets of kind (α, x, r) and define a relation (α, x, r) ∼ (β, x, r) iff α ≡ β, then ∼ is an equivalence relation and we can take the quotient B/ ∼. Now there is a bijection f between B/ ∼ and the set of all bets of kind (U, x, r): just set f (|(α, x, r)|) = (M (α), x, r), where M (α) denotes the set of possible worlds that is the meaning of α, as defined in 2. The function f is well defined because if (α, x, r) ∼ (β, x, r) then α ≡ β and M (α) = M (β). The function is obviously injective and is surjective because every U ⊆ 2 n is M (α) for some α. (This follows from the theorem on disjunctive normal form of classical logic.) As a consequence of the observation above, all bets in the class |(α, x, r)| behave in the same way with respect to b, when no Dutch Book is possible for b, so we can attach the probability value b(α) to the class |(α, x, r)| and this value can be transferred to M (α).
The same problem can be posed for partial bets: if b : F * → T is to represent the partial degree of belief of a decision-maker, logically equivalent formulas of Kleene logic should receive the same partial probability value. The following theorem proves that this is the case when there is no Dutch Book for b. Proof. We assume that α ≡ β and b(α) = (x, y) = (z, w) = b(β), then we show that there is a Dutch Book for b.
Case 1, z − x < w − y. We set B = {(α, (x, y), (1, 1)), (β, (z, w),
Firstly we observe that z − x = 0. (If z − x = 0 then w − y = 0 and x, y, z and w are all 0, that is contrary to our hypothesis (x, y) = (z, w).) Then we distinguish two cases.
Subcase a), z − x < 0. Then w − y < 0 and y − w > 0, so z − x < y − w and ( z − x < y − w) ∈ δ − . We obtain a Dutch Book choosing B = {(α, (x, y), (1, −1)), (β, (z, w), (−1, 1))}, because in this case [B](w) = (z −x, y − w).
Subcase b), 0 < z − x. We set B = {(α, (x, y), (−1, 1)), (β, (z, w), (1, −1))}. Now we can take equivalence classes of partial bets, as we did in the case of classical bets. As all bets in the class |(α, x, r)| behave in the same way with respect to b, when no Dutch Book is possible for b, we can attach the partial probability value b(α) to the class |(α, (x, x ′ ), (r, r ′ ))|, but here the analogy breaks off. If we define a concept of bet where the formula α is replaced by a partial set of possible worlds, i.e. we define a bet as a triple ((U, U ′ ), (x, x ′ ), (r, r ′ )), where (U, U ′ ) ⊆ D(K n ), (x, x ′ ) ∈ T and (r, r ′ ) ∈ R 2 , we obtain a more comprehensive concept of partial bet: there are bets on partial events that cannot be simulated by a bet on a sentence. In fact, we may define a function f (|(α, (x, x ′ ), (r, r ′ )|) = (M (α), (x, x ′ ), (r, r ′ )) as above, where M (α) is the partial set of positive and negative models of α defined in 3, but now f is strictly iniective, because there are partial sets in D(K n ) that cannot be denoted by a formula α. We end this work with a proof of this theorem.
The elements of K, that have been up to now understood as truth values, may also be conceived as values assigned to the amount of information carried by a proposition, to the degree of exactness of an assertion. (In this section we take the original definition of K as {0, n, 1}.) To this end, we define on K a partial order setting x y iff x = y or (x = n and y = 0) or (x = n and y = 1). This partial order can be pointwise extended to K n , so given s, t ∈ K n , s t iff for all i < n, s i t i . The partially ordered set (K n , ) has a minimum n, the sequence that takes always n as value, and 2 n maximal elements, the sequences that take always 0 or 1 as value.
If s and t are seen as possible worlds, then s t means that the situation represented by t is at least so defined as the one described by s. What in s has been definitely settled (marked with 0 or 1) remains unchanged in the passage to t; what has not been definitely settled in s (marked with n) may be (positively or negatively) settled in t. Whereas V s (α) ≤ V s (α) means that there is no loss in truth-value in the passage from α to β, V s (α) V s (α) means that there is no loss of information.
Theorem 8 For all s, t ∈ K n and all α ∈ F * , 1. if s t then V s (α) V t (α), 2. if s t and s ∈ M (α) i then t ∈ M (α) i , for i = 0, 1.
Proof. 1. Firstly, we observe that the functions ¬, ∧, ∨ defined on K (see 3) are isotone. (This can be easily verified by the reader.) Then we suppose s t and prove V s (α) V t (α) by induction on α. If α = p i then V s (p i ) V t (p i ) holds, because s i t i . If α = β ∧ γ then by induction hypothesis we have V s (β) V t (β) and V s (γ) V t (γ), so the result follows by isotonicity of ∧ with respect to . The same proof can be given for ∨ and ¬.
2. As we have seen in 3, s ∈ M (α) 0 iff V al s (α) = 1. So from our hypothesis s t and point 1) above, s ∈ M (α) 0 implies V al t (α) = 1 and t ∈ M (α) 0 . The same proof holds for M (α) 1 .
Corollary 9 The function
Proof. For all s ∈ K n we have s n , so if n ∈ M (α) i then, for all s ∈ K n , s ∈ M (α) i , by the above theorem, and M (α) i = K n . Let (X, Y ) be a Boolean partial set, different from (∅, K n ) and (K n , ∅). Then we have n ∈ X or n ∈ Y and (X, Y ) = M (α), for all α.
